tBTC

Security

would

Aave

<ul>
 <li>A community-submitted proposal called the “Security Shield” would introduce mechanisms like selective collateral maturation delays and borrowing-velocity limits to slow new credit exposure during active security incidents</li>
 <li>The proposal outlines a four-tier Security Response system moving through Observation, Caution, Emergency and Recovery stages</li>
 <li>The proposal explicitly excludes KYC requirements, fund confiscation, or address-based withdrawal blocks, and asks only for a mandate to conduct a feasibility study rather than an immediate budget</li>
</ul>
A proposal titled “AAVE Security Shield” was posted to Aave’s governance forum on November 9, 2026 by an independent community member, proposing a structural response to the kind of security-driven freezes and emergency parameter changes that have repeatedly played out across Aave and other DeFi protocols this year, including in response to the late-October Binance hack and the more recent precautionary pause tied to Threshold Network’s tBTC token.
Rather than responding to each incident on an ad hoc basis through individual Risk Steward actions, as the protocol has done in prior episodes, the proposal envisions a more formalized set of preventive controls. These include a mechanism called selective collateral maturation, which would introduce deliberate delays before certain collateral types become usable, gradual credit enablement that would ramp up new borrowing capacity slowly rather than all at once, and borrowing-velocity limits designed to cap how quickly large positions can be opened during periods of elevated risk.
The proposal organizes these tools under a four-tier Security Response framework: an Observation stage for routine monitoring, a Caution stage triggered by early warning signs, an Emergency stage for active, confirmed incidents, and a Recovery stage for the period after an incident has been contained. Each tier would presumably correspond to different combinations of the proposed throttling mechanisms, though the proposal leaves detailed tier-by-tier specifications for further development.
Notably, the proposal is explicit about what it does not include. It rules out requiring know-your-customer identity verification for users, rules out any mechanism for confiscating funds, and rules out blocking withdrawals based on wallet address, each of which would represent a significant departure from DeFi’s permissionless design principles. By excluding these more invasive options, the author appears to be trying to keep the proposal within bounds the broader Aave community would find acceptable, rather than proposing centralized controls that critics might argue undermine the protocol’s core value proposition.
As a community-submitted idea rather than an official DAO-sponsored proposal, the post asks only for a mandate to conduct a feasibility study, with no budget request attached at this stage, meaning any of the specific mechanisms described remain far from implementation. The <a href="https://governance.aave.com/t/temp-check-aave-security-shield-exploring-preventive-risk-controls-for-external-security-incidents/26124" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow">full proposal is posted on Aave’s own governance forum</a>.
This post first appeared in <a rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" href="https://cryip.co/a-new-aave-proposal-would-let-the-protocol-throttle-lending-during-active-hacks/">A New Aave Proposal Would Let the Protocol Throttle Lending During Active Hacks</a>

A New Aave Proposal Would Let the Protocol Throttle Lending During Active Hacks

CRYIP

Other articles published on Nov 13, 2026

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